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There is a large gap between what finance models predict for individual investor
behavior and what can be observed in their actual behavior. Portfolio theory assumes
that investors form expectations about return and risk of securities and select portfo-
lios according to their expectations and risk preferences. As a consequence they should
hold broadly diversified portfolios and trade very little. But instead, private investors
have been shown to hold underdiversified portfolios, to trade frequently, to take high
idiosyncratic risk, and to gamble in the stock market. To understand this striking dif-
ferences the investment process itself needs greater scrutiny. How do real investors use
their beliefs and preferences in investing decisions? We examine this question using a
panel survey of self-directed online investors at a UK bank. The survey asks for return
expectations, risk expectations, and risk tolerance of these investors in three-month
intervals between 2008 and 2010. We combine the survey data with investors’ actual
trading data and portfolio holdings. We find that investor beliefs have little predictive
power for immediate trading behavior. However, portfolio risk levels and changes are
systematically related to return and risk expectations. In line with financial theory, risk
taking increases with return expectations and decreases with risk expectations.
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1 Introduction
There is a large gap between what finance models predict for individual investor behavior
and what can be observed in their actual behavior. Portfolio theory assumes that investors
form expectations about return and risk of securities and select portfolios according to
their expectations and risk preferences (Markowitz, 1952). As a consequence they should
hold broadly diversified portfolios and trade very little. But instead, private investors have
been shown to hold underdiversified portfolios (Goetzmann and Kumar, 2008), to trade
frequently (Odean, 1999; Barber and Odean, 2000), to take high idiosyncratic risk (Calvet,
Campbell, and Sodini, 2007), and to gamble in the stock market (Kumar, 2009). There
is also evidence, that they use investment strategies different from pure mean-variance
optimization (Lewellen, Lease, and Schlarbaum, 1977; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000). Often
these deviations have been explained by specific psychological biases, e.g. excessive trading
by overconfidence (Odean, 1998; Glaser and Weber, 2007).
However, this way one learns very little about the actual decision making process peo-
ple go through when they invest. How do investors use their beliefs and preferences in this
process? Empirically, there is only scarce evidence on this question as the input parameters
are hard to obtain. The economic paradigm of revealed preferences states that beliefs and
preferences can be inferred from observed actions (Samuelson, 1938). But this already im-
plies that they are perfectly converted into actions. In order to reveal whether and where
this transfer fails, direct information on beliefs and preferences are needed. To this end we
collect return and risk expectations in a repeated panel survey of self-directed private in-
vestors at a large UK online brokerage provider. In three-month intervals these investors are
queried for numerical and qualitative expectations and their risk tolerance. We then match
expectations of investors to their actual transactions in their online brokerage accounts. We
observe volume, timing, and direction of all trades within the survey period, and are able
to calculate portfolio holdings of participants.
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We develop different measures of financial risk taking based on trading behavior and
portfolio holdings of investors. In a first step, we consider the direction of stock trading
and calculate the ratio of buys versus sells. This corresponds to an increase or decrease of
investors’ total equity position. We find that the absolute levels of expectations for market
return and risk do not predict buying and selling behavior. An explanation could be that
previous expectations are already reflected in investors’ portfolios and there is no need
for investors to engage in further transactions. We therefore also test whether changes in
expectations explain buying and selling behavior corresponding to trades reflecting changes
in portfolios. Indeed, improving return expectations have a positive impact on buy-sell
ratios. Thus, quite intuitively, positive return expectations foster buying activity, but there
is no effect of changes in risk expectations or risk attitude on buy-sell ratios.
While immediate trading behavior and direction of trade is a means to alter one’s
risky position, we also directly investigate portfolio risk. We calculate portfolio volatility
and beta for investors in our panel as standard risk measures. This is complemented by
additional measures such as relative volatility and average component volatility (Dorn and
Huberman, 2005). We consider both, levels of portfolio risk at the point in time of survey
rounds and changes in portfolio risk between survey rounds. Levels of risk taking of investors
can be well explained by their beliefs, preferences and demographics. All portfolio risk
measures are positively related to return expectations and risk tolerance, and negatively
related to risk expectations, age, and wealth of investors. These results are consistent with
financial theory and previous literature.
An advantage of our dataset is that it allows studying the dynamics of this relationship
between expectations and risk taking, i.e. whether investors react to changes in expecta-
tions by changing their portfolio composition and thus alter risk exposure. For the volatility
measures this is the case, as we find a positive change in volatility when return expecta-
tions improve and a negative change if investors expect increasing stock market risk. The
relationship is weakest for short-term volatility and portfolio beta, indicating that investors
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manage their portfolios rather based on long-term volatility as a proxy for risk taking. Our
results are robust to several alternative specifications including the use of lagged values to
address endogeneity concerns. Risk tolerance remains insignificant in most of our regres-
sions (both levels and changes), which sheds some light on the debate, whether investors
can translate their level of risk aversion into an adequate portfolio choice (Ehm, Kaufmann,
and Weber, 2012).
Finally we combine the perspectives of trades and portfolio risk and analyze the volatility
of transactions by investors. This allows us to gain a deeper understanding of how investors
regulate their portfolio risk. The analysis reveals that more optimistic investors shift part
of their investments to more volatile securities. In addition to expanding their total equity
position by purchases in excess of sales, they also buy riskier assets. This is consistent with
the finding that portfolio volatility not just passively moves with market volatility, but also
relative portfolio volatility increases for optimistic investors.
We continue with a theoretical motivation and an overview of related literature in section
2, followed by a description of the data sets, which contains two main sources, the survey and
the trading data. In section 4 we present results about the relationship between investor
expectations and trading behavior, which we then discuss in section 5. A final section
concludes.
2 Theory and literature
People acting on their beliefs and preferences are such a basic assumption in economic theory
that it has seldom been contested. Exemplarily, portfolio theory as the canonical finance
model posits that investors form expectations about return and risk of securities and then
choose an optimal portfolio according to their risk preferences (Markowitz, 1952). We will
now in a more formal but simple way derive directional predictions for the influence of
return expectations, risk expectations, and risk tolerance on financial risk taking behavior.
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We assume an investor to have power utility defined over wealth W of the form U(W ) =
W 1−θ−1/(1−θ). Power utility has the desirable property of declining absolute risk aversion
and constant relative risk aversion, which is most consistent with real world observations.
The investor in a simple two-period economy faces the budget constraint W1 = W0(1+r0,1),
implying that the only source of wealth at time t=1 is wealth in t=0 plus the return earned
on wealth. The corresponding maximization problem thus is:
max E0[(W0(1 + r0,1))
1−θ/(1 − θ)]. (1)
When instead of expression 1 the logarithm of this expectation is maximized, the problem
simplifies to (for a detailed derivation cp. Campbell and Viceira, 2002):
max lnE0(1 + r0,1) − 1
2
θσ20, (2)
where σ20 is the conditional variance of the log return. In expression 2 the ingredients of the
maximization problem are visible; the investor trades off expected return against expected
risk (variance of returns). The parameter θ of the utility function describes the investor’s
relative risk aversion.
With only two assets, a risky asset s and a riskless asset f, return on wealth is r0,1 =
rf,0,1+ws,0(rs,0,1−rf,0,1), where ws,0 represents the weight an investor puts on the risky asset.
A little complication arises from the fact that power utility operates under the assumption
of lognormally distributed returns, but log return on wealth cannot be expressed as a linear
combination of the log return of the two assets. Instead, Campbell and Viceira (2002)
suggest a Taylor approximation to rewrite (2) in the form
max ws,0(E0rs,0,1 − rf,0,1) + 1
2
ws,0(1 − ws,0)σ20 +
1
2
(1 − θ)w2s,0σ20, (3)
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which can be solved by
ws,0 =
E0rs,0,1 − rf,0,1 + σ20/2
θσ20
. (4)
The equation implies that the share of risky investment should increase with expected
returns for the risky asset, and decrease with risk expectations and risk aversion. This
result can be generalized to a multi-asset or multi-period framework and is fairly robust to
the relexation of several of the chosen assumptions. A simple mean-variance optimization
comes to the same conclusions, as does—from a slightly different angle—risk-value theory
(Sarin and Weber, 1993). We take the results of this model as a prediction for the role of
expectations and risk preferences in investing behavior.
Empirically, risk taking behavior of individual investors has been studied using different
approaches and datasets. Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) analyzes a US individual investor survey
by UBS/Gallup and finds a strong positive effect of expected return on equity share in self-
reported investor portfolios. Dorn and Huberman (2005) report portfolio volatilities for a
sample of German brokerage clients and identify risk aversion as most predictive for portfolio
volatility. Moreover, younger, self-employed, less sophisticated, and poorer investors tend
to hold more risky portfolios. Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2007) examine disaggregated
wealth data covering the entire Swedish population and show a positive impact of wealth,
income, and education on risk taking measured by portfolio volatility.1 They also break
down portfolio risk in its various components and reveal interesting patterns of risk taking.
In a follow-up study, Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2009) present evidence on rebalancing
suggesting that investors actively control their share of risky investments and offset changes
brought about by passive market variations.
1The seemingly contradictory results might be explained by the different composition of the datasets.
While Dorn and Huberman (2005) analyze stock portfolios, where wealth and financial sophistication usually
lead to a better diversification (and thus less risk), Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2007) use total wealth
portfolios for which wealth and sophistication typically lead to a greater equity share (and thus more risk).
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While this literature addresses risk taking behavior of private investor, it lacks a sys-
tematic study of the input variables we are interested in: individual investor beliefs in form
of return and risk expectations, and investor risk preferences. Closest related to our study
is the work by Amromin and Sharpe (2009), Weber, Weber, and Nosic´ (2012), Hoffmann,
Post, and Pennings (2010), and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2011). Similar to us Am-
romin and Sharpe (2009) use panel data, in their case coming from the Michigan Survey of
Consumer Attitudes. However, they analyze self-reported portfolio shares of survey partic-
ipants and do not have access to their transactions or actual portfolios. They concentrate
on the interrelation of return expectations and risk expectations, but also provide some ev-
idence of the influence of these variables on portfolio composition. Consistent with financial
theory higher return expectations and lower risk expectations increase the share of equity in
portfolios of investors. Hoffmann, Post, and Pennings (2010) study an investor survey in the
Netherlands which is matched to brokerage account data. Their data spans a time period
from April 2008 to March 2009 and survey rounds are administered monthly. By eliciting
expectations and portfolio characteristics, Hoffmann, Post, and Pennings (2010) establish
a link between the beliefs of investors and their trading behavior concentrating on investor
performance. They find that high return expectations, low risk expectations, and low risk
tolerance contribute to high returns and Sharpe ratios.
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2011) in their analysis concentrate on risk aversion mea-
sured by a qualitative and a quantitative approach. They report a substantial increase of
risk aversion in the financial crisis compared to pre-crisis levels. Ownership of risky assets is
negatively related to risk aversion. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2011) suggest psycholog-
ical factors as drivers of risk aversion, as they are able to rule out alternative explanations
such as wealth or background risk.
In a previous analysis of our dataset, Weber, Weber, and Nosic´ (2012) report a relation-
ship between expectations and investing decisions. They analyze a survey question which
asks participants to split a hypothetical amount of £100, 000 between an investment in the
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UK stock market and a riskless asset. With this investment task they are able to show a
strong influence of changes in expectations and risk attitude on changes in the proportion of
risky investment; this influence is in the expected direction, increases in expected returns or
risk tolerance lead to an increase in risky investment, while higher risk expectations render
investors more cautious. We extend this research by relating return and risk expectations
to the actual trades and portfolios of investors. By analyzing various aspects of investing
behavior, we present a more complete portrayal of the underlying relationships. We also
exploit the full time series of the survey which was not available to the earlier study by
Weber, Weber, and Nosic´ (2012).
3 Data
We obtain survey responses and transaction data for a sample of clients at Barclays Stock-
brokers, a UK direct brokerage provider. Barclays is one of the largest brokers in the UK
and attracts a wide variety of customers (for demographic characteristics of its clients see
Egan, Merkle, and Weber, 2010). The accounts are self-directed in the sense that customers
can inform themselves on special webpages provided by the bank, but receive no direct
investment advice. Most transactions are processed online.
3.1 Survey data
In collaboration with Barclays Wealth, we conduct a repeated survey taking place every
three months, beginning in September 2008 and ending in September 2010. Figure 1 shows
the development of the UK stock market represented by the FTSE all share index and
the timing of survey rounds. Our panel consists of nine rounds covering a time period of
highly volatile market environment. We thus expect participants to express changing beliefs
about market prospects; in the standard model this would in turn lead to changes in their
portfolios.
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In the initial survey a stratified sample of the banks client base was invited via e-mail
to participate in the online questionnaire (for details on the sampling procedure see Weber,
Weber, and Nosic´, 2012). In total 617 clients of the bank participated in the survey, 394
of which participated multiple times. 189 participants have completed at least five rounds,
and 52 have participated in all nine rounds. We have a minimum of 130 observations for
each of the nine rounds. We will discuss potential selection effects in section 4.4.
We elicit beliefs about return and risk expectations in two ways, by a numerical question
asking for return expectations in percentage terms and a more subjective evaluation of risk
and return on a bipolar scale. The wording of the numerical question is as follows:
We would like you to make three estimates of the return of the UK stock market (FTSE
all-share) by the end of the next three month.
- Your best estimate should be your best guess.
- Your high estimate should very rarely be lower than the actual outcome of the FTSE
all-share (about once in 20 occasions)
- Your low estimate should very rarely be higher than the actual outcome of the FTSE
all-share (about once in 20 occasions)
Please enter your response as a percentage change.
The question asks participants to predict the three-month return of the UK stock market.
We use this time horizon to avoid overlapping observations as the distance between survey
rounds is three month as well. One might argue that these short-term expectations will
be irrelevant, if investors have a longer investment horizon. However, we find them to be
highly correlated with one year expectations which were elicited twice during the survey. We
suspect that three-month expectations express an investor’s current optimism or pessimism
about the market not limited to the particular time interval.2
In a design similar to Glaser and Weber (2005), participants have to submit a best
estimate as well as a high and a low estimate, which together yield a 90%-confidence interval.
We take the best estimate to represent an investor’s return expectation about the UK stock
2In addition, high portfolio turnover reported below implies that short-term expectations should certainly
matter.
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market. The high and low estimates allow calculating implicit expected volatility of investors
which we use as numerical risk estimate (applying the method of Keefer and Bodily, 1983).
We use this indirect way as it has been shown that people often have difficulties with numeric
risk estimates (Windschitl and Wells, 1996; Dave, Eckel, Johnson, and Rojas, 2010).
Furthermore, numeric estimates may not cover all aspects of expected risks and benefits
which are partly emotional (Loewenstein, Hsee, Weber, and Welch, 2001). We therefore
include qualitative questions, which ask people to evaluate return and risk on a seven-point
scale.
- How would you rate the returns you expect from an investment in the UK stock market
(FTSE all-share) over the next 3 months?
- Over the next 3-months, how risky do you think the UK stock market (FTSE all-share)
is?
In the first question answer alternatives range from “extremely bad” to “extremely
good”, in the second question from “not risky at all” to “extremely risky”. We ask equivalent
questions for investors’ own portfolios held with Barclays. In total we thus collect eight
belief items per investor per round. Risk tolerance of investors is measured as agreement
to the statement “It is likely I would invest a significant sum in a high risk investment”
(on a seven-point scale). Weber, Weber, and Nosic´ (2012) show that this statement is the
most diagnostic within a more complete assessment of risk preferences. Besides these core
variables the survey contains further queries about demographics, psychological dispositions
and investment objectives. We will refer to these in the result section where appropriate.
3.2 Survey responses
Average numeric return expectations are relatively low before the peak of the financial
crisis, then rise during the crisis and fall again, when the UK stock market recovers. Figure
2 shows the pattern in detail. In general investors tend to be more optimistic about their
own portfolios: the average return expectations are consistently higher and the difference is
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non-trivial (2-4%-points). In contrast to market expectations, average portfolio expectations
remain high throughout 2009 and only decline afterwards. While market expectations are
in a reasonable range adding up to an annual return of 8-12% (compared to a FTSE all-
share historical return of about 8%), the absolute level of portfolio expectations seems
unrealistically high (probably explained by overconfidence cp. Merkle, 2012).
Investors in our panel (numerically) underestimate stock market risk (cp. Glaser, Langer,
and Weber, 2012). The implied volatilities calculated from the confidence intervals of in-
vestors’ return expectations are much lower than volatility expectations of sophisticated
market participants (represented by implied option volatilities, see figure 3). While con-
fidence intervals are too narrow in the initial survey round, investors seem to learn from
observed outcomes that extreme realizations are possible and enlarge their confidence inter-
vals. Expected volatility thus increases, but is still below implied option volatility. Further-
more after the initial adjustment the confidence intervals remain insensitive to subsequent
market developments.
Qualitative risk expectations elicited on a seven-point scale reflect more closely implied
market risk expectations. While it is not possible to compare the absolute magnitudes,
we find a correlation of 0.78 (p < 0.02) between average qualitative risk expectations and
implied option volatilities. Quite intuitively risk expectations rise with the peak of the
financial crisis and then fall afterwards. However, there are two further increases in panelists’
risk expectations: one without a corresponding rise in option market expectations (Sep to
Dec 2009), and another, which falls together with the onset of European debt crisis (June
2010). In general expectations for own portfolio risk follow this trend, but are on average
slightly lower and more stable than market expectations. It is noteworthy that investors
appear to believe they can earn higher returns bearing less risk (cp. Kempf, Merkle, and
Niessen, 2012).
For investigating trading behavior over time, changes in expectations are particularly
important. Table 1 shows average changes for all expectation variables. We observe a signif-
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icant increase in average return and risk expectations between round one and three followed
by a very mixed pattern from round three to four (further increase of qualitative return
and numerical risk expectations, but sharp drop of qualitative risk expectations). Changes
in expectations are less pronounced for the time after the immediate crisis. An exception is
the very last survey round for which we observe strongly increasing return expectations and
decreasing risk expectations. Similar to Weber, Weber, and Nosic´ (2012), we find that the
correlations between changes of numeric and qualitative expectations are often low (return)
or insignificant (risk). Stronger correlations exist between market and portfolio expectations.
Average risk tolerance remains fairly stable over the whole survey period.
3.3 Trading data
Our data also include the trading records of all investors active in the panel survey. We
include three month prior to our first survey round and three month after our last survey
round. In the resulting period between June 2008 and December 2010 we observe 49,372
trades with a total trading volume of £258,940,694. Of these trades 37,022 or 75% are
in stocks (63% of trading volume). In some parts of the analysis we will concentrate on
these equity transactions as they are closest related to the expectations we elicit among
investors. The remaining trades include bonds, derivatives, mutual funds and ETFs. The
average trader in the panel trades 84.1 times within the 2.5 year period (about three times
per month), with a total trading volume of £441,126. However, the distribution is strongly
skewed, the median trader trades only 33 times (about once a month; total volume £72,805).
We observe most pronounced trading activity in the initial phase of the financial crisis;
investors seem to feel a need to react to the turbulent times on asset markets.
Combining trading data with a snapshot of investors’ portfolios we are able to calculate
portfolio statistics for our survey period. The median portfolio is worth £41,687 (average
£314,663) and median portfolio turnover on a per round basis (three month) is 19% (mean
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77%), which means that the median investor turns over his portfolio about twice in the
survey period of 2.5 years, and some turn over their portfolio ten times or more.
We use the transaction records to develop several measures of risk taking behavior. As
we cannot directly observe the share of risky assets as described in equation 4, we define
two alternatives that cover different aspects of risk taking. First, we consider the balance of
purchases and sales of stocks in the trading records of investors, as in most cases, extending
one’s equity position corresponds to an increase in financial risk taking, while a reduction
of one’s equity position corresponds to a decrease in risk taking. We form two ratios of buys
divided by total trades, based on the number and volume of investors’ equity transactions,
respectively. Similar ratios have been used by Ritter (1988),Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000),
and Bhattacharya, Holden, and Jacobsen (2010).
We expect buy-sell imbalance to be related to investors’ stock market expectations: with
high return expectations for the stock market, the propensity to buy should rise relative to
the propensity to sell, while the opposite effect is predicted for high risk expectations and
high risk aversion. More precisely, only changes in expectations and preferences should be
relevant for changes in portfolios (cp. Weber, Weber, and Nosic´, 2012). However, as this is
a stark theoretical assumption, we analyze both levels and changes of expectations.
A second strategy to assess financial risk taking of investors is by measures of port-
folio risk such as volatility and beta (cp. Dorn and Huberman, 2005; Calvet, Campbell,
and Sodini, 2007; McInish, 1982). Financial theory posits that the composition of the risky
portfolio should not change, but risk is entirely adjusted via the share of the risky portfolio
(fund separation, Tobin, 1958). However, in practice there are large differences in composi-
tion and risk of portfolios suggesting that investors manage their overall risk taking at least
in part by portfolio risk. Therefore, we apply the theoretical predictions in equation 4 also
to portfolio risk measures, and expect higher portfolio risk in response to a positive change
in return expectations or a negative change in risk expectations.
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We calculate volatility of portfolios over one year and over three months horizons. We
calculate portfolio beta over a one year horizon using the FTSE all-share index as cor-
responding market index (this choice seems justified as survey participants hold most of
their investments (> 90%) in the UK stock market). Taking into account that within a
volatile market environment a large part of the changes in portfolio volatility will be pas-
sively caused by changes in market volatility, we also measure relative volatility as a ratio
of portfolio volatility divided by market volatility. Dorn and Huberman (2010) argue that
portfolio volatility is not the correct measure of risk if investors disregard correlations be-
tween securities. They propose a value-weighted average of the return volatilities of portfolio
components (ACV), which reflects risk taking if investors mainly orient themselves at the
volatility of individual securities rather than portfolio volatility. Again we consider levels
and changes of these variables.
3.4 Descriptive statistics of investor risk-taking
For all rounds average buy-sell ratios exceed 50%, which implies that investors are net
buyers. There is almost no difference between ratios based on number of trades and volume,
correlation is 0.94 (p < 0.01). We observe the highest buy-sell imbalance for late 2008, at the
peak of the financial crisis, when the ratios reach about 0.66. This suggests that investors
in our sample view the crisis as an opportunity to buy at low prices. There is also large
cross-sectional variation in buy-sell ratios between investors, which is crucial for our analysis
of the differential influence of expectations and preferences.
Figure 4 displays portfolio volatilities of the median investor, the first-quartile investor,
and third-quartile investor in our panel at the time of each survey round. The volatility of
the FTSE all-share index serves for comparison. Median portfolio volatility in our panel rises
from 0.26 in June 2008 to about 0.40 during the crisis, before falling to values around 0.18 for
the last year of the survey. It remains constantly above market volatility, which indicates that
a majority of investors hold portfolios that are riskier than the UK market portfolio. The
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difference between median portfolio volatility and market volatility is strongly significant
for all rounds (p < 0.01, Wilcoxon signed-rank test). The third quartile shows that many
investors hold very volatile portfolios compared to the market index, while the first quartile
is still close to that index. The average component volatility (ACV, not displayed) exceeds
these portfolio volatilities by about 40% as it does not account for diversification effects.
High portfolio volatility of investors is not due to high levels of systematic risk, as the
median beta is around 0.8 over the whole sample period and most investors hold portfolios
with a beta smaller than one. Instead, high volatility is driven by idiosyncratic risk as a
result of a low degree of diversification. Relative volatilities suggest that investors in the
immediate phase of the financial crisis try to reduce their risk exposure relative to the
market, while they increase it again afterwards. Changes in beta confirm a reduction in
systematic risk for the first phase of the crisis, while for later rounds the results remain
inconclusive.
4 Results
4.1 Investor trading behavior
We first investigate whether market expectations drive the decision of investors to increase
or decrease their stock market exposure, which is measured by buy-sell ratios. We estimate
a panel tobit model with random effects as the buy-sell ratios are limited on the interval
between 0 and 1, and values on the boundaries occur frequently. We consider two speci-
fications, one in which the absolute levels of expectations are relevant for investors, and
another in which investors are supposed to react on changes in expectations.
Column 1 and 5 of table 2 show the results of the buy-sell ratios regressed on expectation
levels. More precisely, we measure expectations at the time of the survey and then observe
buy-sell ratios in the three month afterwards until the next survey takes place. Levels of
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expectations seem to have little effect on subsequent buying and selling behavior. Among the
few marginally significant effects is a negative coefficient for risk tolerance. An explanation
might be that risk tolerant investors already hold high equity positions and tend to reduce
their exposure during the financial crisis. However, this effect is not robust to the inclusion
of additional explanatory variables.
Changes in expectations are defined over the same time horizon (between surveys), for
which buy-sell ratios are calculated. The lower number of observations in the changes re-
gressions is due to the fact that for changes in expectations we need investors to participate
in the survey for two consecutive rounds. Among the changes variables, changes in numeric
return expectations exert a significant effect on buy-sell behavior (column 2 and 6). If re-
turn expectations improve investors tend to move to the buying side of the market, which
is consistent with the theoretic prediction. For additional equity purchases thus not the
absolute level of return expectations is relevant, but instead changes in these expectations.
This result is robust to the inclusion of the levels variables (column 3 and 7) and of de-
mographic variables: age, gender, wealth, and financial literacy (column 4 and 8).3. Income
quite intuitively has a positive effect on buy-sell ratios as it is a proxy for additional liq-
uidity investors might want to invest. For the remaining demographic variables we find no
significant effect.
The coefficients in table 2 represent marginal effects, which directly allow an interpre-
tation in terms of economic significance. A 10%-point increase in return expectations will
raise buy-sell ratios by about three percent. For comparison moving upward one category
in income has about the same effect. In unreported results, we exclude heavy traders (the
top 10% in number of trades and trading volume), as these investors might be engaged
in trading activity independent of their current beliefs or other situational factors. When
investors, who trade less frequently, place an order, this order might be more closely related
to personal return and risk expectations. However, there is almost no change in the results
under this restriction. For robustness, as the presented panel tobit model cannot account
3The exact definition of these variables is provided in the appendix
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for potential heteroscedasticity, we test several alternatives. A linear panel regression with
clustered standard errors by individual, a fixed effects regression, and a regression with least
absolute deviation (LAD) estimators. The results are reported in table 3.
Clustered standard errors take into account the non-independence of observations within
our sample. Column (1) and (4) confirms the strongly positive impact of changes in return
expectations. In a fixed effects model effects are less pronounced and only marginally sig-
nificant as much of the cross-sectional variation is eliminated. Part of the effect is picked
up by changes in qualitative expectations.4 Finally, the LAD regression (columns 3 and 6)
has favorable small sample properties in reducing the importance of outliers. The effect of
changes in return expectations is robust to this specification.
4.2 Investor portfolio risk
We now turn to investor portfolio risk, which might be a more stable measure of investor
risk taking. In our analysis, we interpret the volatility levels of investors’ portfolios when
the survey takes place as the level of risk an investor is taking at this point in time. Conse-
quently, changes in volatility correspond to changes in risk taking.5 Similarly, we use levels
and changes of other portfolio risk measures (beta, relative volatility, average component
volatility).
Panel A of table 4 shows correlations between the levels of these measures; all correlations
are positive as they share a common concept of risk, but the variables also capture different
aspects of risk as correlations are not perfect. In particular, portfolio beta shows the weakest
relation to other risk measures with coefficients between 0.23 and 0.43. When considering
4The correlation between changes in numerical and qualitative expectations is positive but low (0.26),
suggesting that multicollinearity is not an issue. An explanation for the emergence of the qualitative rating
effect is that the used scale lacks inter-subject comparability, but is a good predictor within subjects (fixed-
effects model).
5This is a deliberate analogy to levels and changes in the hypothetical risk taking task analyzed by Weber,
Weber, and Nosic´ (2012). In this task investors had to divide £100,000 between the FTSE-all share and a
riskless asset. If we assume a volatility of 0 for the riskless asset, the volatility of the chosen portfolio is
monotonically increasing with the fraction invested in the FTSE.
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changes (Panel B) the picture becomes even more mixed. All but one correlation are still
positive, but especially for beta and three-month volatility (which is the only measure
calculated over a shorter time horizon) coefficients are low. As portfolio risk measures differ,
we consider most of them in our regression analysis (except relative volatility which is
redundant in the levels analysis). We take the natural logarithm of the volatility variables,
as volatilities are skewed within our sample.
We use market expectations as explanatory variables to avoid reverse causality inherent
with portfolio expectations, as current portfolio volatility will determine expectations for
future portfolio returns and volatility. Table 5 shows the results of a panel GLS regression
with random effects and clustered standard errors (columns 1-4) and a fixed effects regression
(columns 5-8). We find that the risk level investors take on in their portfolios depends on
their expectations. In all regressions, a positive impact of numerical return expectations
on volatilities and a negative impact of numerical risk expectations can be observed. Both
effects are significant in most specifications, the effects are weakest for portfolio beta (also
confirmed by low R2). Risk tolerance and qualitative expectations mostly have no predictive
power for portfolio risk. Among the demographic variables, we find significant effects for age,
wealth and financial literacy. Younger investors hold more volatile portfolios, while wealthier
investors tend to own less risky portfolios. This result is consistent with the findings of Dorn
and Huberman (2005).
Even though using market expectations addresses the most obvious endogeneity prob-
lem, there might still be concerns that own portfolio risk determines also market expec-
tations. Therefore, we repeat the previous analysis using lagged expectations and lagged
preferences. The timing now is such that we use the expectations of each survey date to
explain portfolio risk three month later. Results in 6 confirm the impact of numerical return
and risk expectations on portfolio risk. The most notable difference is that in the lagged
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regression risk tolerance has a more consistent positive effect on risk taking, suggesting that
it takes some time for investors to implement their risk preferences.6
The interpretation in terms of economic significance is straightforward, as the dependent
variable is log transformed. 10%-points higher return expectation will induce investors to
hold a portfolio with 1.65% higher volatility (1.27% for lagged expectations). Analogously,
a 10%-points higher expected volatility relates to a 1.31% decrease in portfolio volatility
(1.16% for lagged expectations).
Up to this point we dealt with state variables that give us some information which portfo-
lio risk investors choose depending on their expectations, risk tolerance, and demographics.
The panel structure of our data allows us to investigate at more detail the dynamics of
these relationships. We now analyze changes of portfolio risk in response to contempora-
neous changes in investor expectations and preferences. The assumption is that investors
in addition to adjusting their risky share as suggested by equation 4 also change portfolio
composition. We adopt a parallel approach to the levels regression and again estimate a
random effects and a fixed effects model.
Table 7 shows the results of these regressions. With changes in one-year portfolio volatil-
ity (column 1 and 6) we observe the same patterns as in the levels regression. Positive
changes in numerical return expectations are accompanied by increased risk taking, while
higher numerical risk expectations result in decreased risk taking. In the regressions of
changes in three-month volatilities on changes in expectations (see table 7), the coefficients
for numerical expectations maintain their direction, but no longer reach statistical signifi-
cance. This may be due to the diminished statistical power of the changes regressions, as
we can only consider investors who participate in two subsequent survey rounds. However,
another interpretation is that investors have more long-term objectives and do not manage
6As a further test we instrument contemporaneous expectations by lagged expectations. While the results
are consistent in directionality, significance is weak. However, instrumentation is costly in terms of statistical
power, as it requires consecutive observations. Additionally, there are concerns about weak instruments as
correlations between expectations and lagged expectations are only around 0.3.
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their portfolios according to three-month volatilities. In our questionnaire, most investors
state an investment horizon of three to five years.
For relative volatility and average component volatility similar patterns as for volatility
emerge. In particular numerical return expectations positively influence risk taking. Changes
in relative volatility most closely reflect investors’ active interventions to alter portfolio risk,
as raw portfolio volatility is in large part driven by changes in market volatility. As already
found for levels, beta is the risk measure least related to expectations. It is likely that
beta has little relevance to investors in managing the risk of their portfolios. Many private
investors may not even know about this concept.
In unreported results, we substitute round dummies by market volatility, which is con-
stant across participants and will thus capture the part of changes in portfolio volatility
caused by a passive change in overall market volatility. In portfolio volatility regressions
the coefficient of market volatility is about 0.7, which means that about 70% of changes
in portfolio volatilities are driven by changes in market volatility. Interestingly, changes in
market volatility have a negative impact on relative volatility, suggesting investors attempt
to counteract rising market volatility in an attempt to reduce their portfolio risk relative to
the market.
4.3 Volatility of trades
We combine the two approaches of measuring financial risk taking and examine the volatility
of securities investors are trading. For this purpose, all securities traded by survey partic-
ipants (and for which a sufficient time series of returns is available) are sorted by return
volatility throughout the survey period. We form ten volatility deciles and hereby establish
a ranking of securities by their relative riskiness. We then calculate the value-weighted av-
erage of volatility decile each investor trades in. We also compute the volatility of purchases
and the volatility differential between purchases and sales. The latter we interpret similar to
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buy-sell ratios as an indicator of financial risk taking; if the difference is positive an investor
shifts money to more volatile securities.
Table 8 shows population averages of volatility of trades, of volatility of purchases, and
the average buy-sell volatility differential. We observe that investors trade securities that
are slightly more volatile than the total sample of securities (which of course has an average
decile rank of 5.5). This is due to the fact that mutual funds and ETFs are less frequently
traded than more volatile securities such as stocks and options. Volatility of trades and
purchases is highest in the first two rounds of the survey; these are also the only rounds
where the buy-sell volatility differential is positive which confirms the earlier finding that
private investors in our sample seem to view the crisis as an opportunity to buy risky
securities. This behavior then turns around, in particular for a period of high stock market
gains in mid-2009 (cp. also figure 1). Investors move back into safer securities, a behavior
that repeats itself for the final survey rounds, for which the average volatility of trades is
lowest on average.
When we regress the three measures defined above on the levels of investors’ expec-
tations and risk tolerance (table 9), we find no effect on overall trade volatility, a slight
effect on the volatility of purchases and a pronounced impact on the buy-sell volatility
differential. This means that investors shift capital towards riskier securities in presence
of high return expectations. This confirms the results of the previous section, as we now
learn how investors adjust their portfolio volatility in response to positive expectations:
they buy high volatility securities and sell low volatility securities. We also find that less
risk-averse investors buy securities with higher volatility, in line with risk habitat theory
which states that investors select securities of which volatilities are commensurate with their
risk aversion (Dorn and Huberman, 2010).7 Again older, wealthier, and more sophisticated
investors trade less volatile securities. We do not report results for a regression on changes
in expectations in this case, as we find no significant results.
7There is no such effect for buy-sell volatility differentials, but this is not surprising as both risk-averse
and risk tolerant investors will sometimes augment and sometimes reduce risk (though on different levels).
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4.4 Selection effects
Our sample is clearly not representative, neither for the total UK population, nor for UK
stock market investors, maybe not even for Barclays’ online brokerage clients. We make no
claim in this regard. However, we do still believe that our data are meaningful and allow
to draw some inferences about investing behavior in response to personal expectations and
preferences. While one has to be careful not to over-generalize our findings, we have no
evidence of systematic selection in our sample, which would invalidate our results. In this
section we analyze selection issues in a formal way.
Given the relatively low (but not uncommon8) response rate and the presence of attrition
in our panel, there are two potential channels of selection. Specific investors might be more
attracted to participate in the survey, or they leave and rejoin the sample in a non-random
way, both potentially biasing our results. We have only limited data on non-participants,
including age and gender, as well as some portfolio information (portfolio value, number
of positions, number of transactions).9 We use these items as explanatory variables in a
participation regression, results are reported in column 1 of table 10. We find that male
investors and investors with a higher number of holdings and transactions are more likely to
participate in the survey. The latter are potentially more active and interested in financial
markets, which would explain this result.
While this supports the presence of selection on observables in our sample, it may
remain inconsequential for our results. We run a two-stage Heckmann selection model to
test for this possibility. In column 2a and 2b, we reproduce the regression of portfolio value
on expectations including the inverse Mills ratio of the first stage. The inverse Mills ratio
is highly significant, again suggesting selection effect. However, our main result regarding
the influence of expected return and expected risk on risk taking remains intact. It is also
robust to an inclusion of the set of variables from the participation regression (column 2b).
8In similar survey studies Graham and Harvey (2001) report a response rate of 9%, Glaser and Weber
(2007) of 7%, Dorn and Sengmueller (2009) of 6%, compared to our 3%.
9The remaining demographic variables such as income and wealth were self-reported survey items.
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Not surprisingly, portfolio value and number of positions are strongly negatively related to
portfolio volatility, as they come along with a diversification effect. In contrast, number of
transactions has a positive effect on volatility. In this specification, the significance of the
inverse Mills ratio is much reduced, as the additional variables capture part of the selection
effect.
We find similar results for the other levels specifications, meaning that despite selection
is present in our sample, our results are mainly unaffected by it. The changes regressions
by making use of the in-sample variation over time, are per se less vulnerable against this
type of selection.
Next, we analyze the participation in the panel over time to detect any signs of sys-
tematic attrition. To make sure that this type of selection does not bias our main results
we again use a Heckman selection model. We follow Wooldridge (1995) in estimating the
participation equation separately for each round of the panel, including demographics and
lagged survey variables. Instead of displaying these roundwise first stage regressions, ta-
ble 10 shows a panel probit version of the participation regression (column 3). It demon-
strates that wealthier investors are more likely to participate, while higher income investors
are less likely to participate. Intuitively, those with higher income might be more time-
constraint. More importantly, lagged expectations do not explain subsequent participation,
which means that it is not the case that e.g. optimists or more risk tolerant investors are
more likely to continue the survey.
We then re-estimate in the second stage the panel regression as before, including now
inverse Mills ratios from the roundwise participation regressions. This time we find no
significance for the Mills ratio, suggesting no strong evidence for selection effects in the
sense of systematic panel attrition. Our main results are unchanged in both specifications,
whether using random effects (4a) or fixed effects (4b). We also find no evidence that the
changes regression of table 7 is affected by selection. We thus conclude that while selection
22
is present in our sample, it seems to have little influence on the effect of expectations and
preferences on risk taking behavior.
5 Discussion
A main problem any research in beliefs and expectations encounters is whether the responses
in a survey are valid representations of the internal beliefs of participants. The challenge is
twofold, questions need to be stated in a way that participants are able to answer them in
a sensible way, and participants need to be motivated to do so. For the latter we rely on
the intrinsic motivation of participants as they completed the survey voluntarily, and many
found it interesting enough to take part multiple times. As in most large-scale surveys,
monetary incentives were not feasible, but we are in this case not aware of any obvious
reason to conceal or distort beliefs in their absence.10 Additionally we build on the finding of
Weber, Weber, and Nosic´ (2012)—who use the same survey—that the elicited expectations
are effective and consistent predictors of decisions, which should attenuate concerns about
their validity.
The other concern that participants might not be able to express their beliefs in the
question format provided to them is taken into account by the use of both, numerical and
qualitative elicitation of expectations. While the numerical estimates are more demanding,
in particular with respect to confidence intervals, they have the advantage of being compa-
rable across participants. On the other hand qualitative estimates may capture aspects of
value and risk not comprised in the first two moments of a distribution. Interestingly, we find
with rare exceptions that only numerical expectations are relevant for actual financial risk
taking decisions, which is in contrast to the results of Weber, Weber, and Nosic´ (2012) who
establish a strong influence of qualitative expectations on allocations in the hypothetical
10For a discussion about when monetary incentives are useful see Camerer and Hogarth (1999). Other
surveys that do not incentivize participants include the Michigan Survey of Consumers, the German Socioe-
conomic Panel and most surveys on investing behavior.
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investment task. We test whether the explanatory power of numerical expectations changes
over to qualitative expectations if we drop numerical expectations from the regressions. In
general, this is not the case and the impact of qualitative expectations remains weak.
An explanation thus has to consider the decision process in the hypothetical investment
task compared to actual investing. First of all, we find our measures of financial risk taking
only weakly correlated with the proportion of risky investment in the survey task which
already hints at the two being different. In particular the changes of risk taking in the
task and investors’ portfolios are unrelated. We conjecture that the qualitative expectations
are affective evaluations of the market situation, while the numerical estimates draw on
more cognitive resources (cp. Kuhnen and Knutson, 2011). We would then expect these
evaluations to be predictive for decisions that are made in the same “mode” of thinking.11
If the actual investment decisions of investors are preceded by a more deliberate thought
process than the allocations in the hypothetical task, this would at least partly explain the
greater predictive power of numerical expectations for these decisions. As we cannot fully
explore the underlying mechanisms, this might be an interesting avenue for future research.
We also consider the time structure of expectations and trading, and throughout the
paper we opted for an approach that tries to explain changes in investing behavior by
contemporaneous changes in expectations. Another possibility would be that investors need
some time to react on changes in expectations, for example because of inertia. When we
use lagged level variables many of the described relationships between expectations and
investment behavior can still be observed (cp. table 6).12 However, the effects are in general
equal or weaker than for contemporaneous expectations. We thus conclude that investors
tend to implement their beliefs in a timely manner.
11Support for this dual-process theories of information processing and decision making can be found e.g.
in Kahneman (2003).
12A similar analysis for changes is precluded by the fact, that a change ∆t+1,t is mechanically (negatively)
correlated to ∆t,t−1 over the shared observation in t.
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As a complement to our research, the investor survey of Hoffmann, Post, and Pennings
(2010) has an overlap of seven month with our data. Elicited expectations and portfolio
characteristics show some similarities: For instance return expectations of Dutch investors
also rise from September to December 2008 and further to March 2009, and trading and
buying activity increases in response to the crisis. Similar to us Hoffmann, Post, and Pen-
nings (2010) find that median portfolio volatility is higher than market volatility and closely
tracks the market index. However, there are some differences as well, e.g. risk perceptions
fall gradually after a peak in September 2008, while in our data they rise and then stay on
a high level until March 2009. This might be due to the different wording of the question,
which in Hoffmann, Post, and Pennings (2010) refers to current risk perception while our
approach is more forward looking. Nevertheless taken together the findings suggest that
there exist some more general properties in expectations of private investors that are not
limited to a particular dataset.
In a regression of buy-sell ratios on beliefs and preferences, Hoffmann, Post, and Pennings
(2010) find very different results. They use qualitative measures of expectations—which in
our case remained insignificant—and demonstrate a negative effect of return expectations
(levels and changes) and a positive effect of risk perception (levels and changes). This is
inconsistent with financial theory and we are unable to confirm this result. However, it con-
tributes to our impression that immediate trading behavior is hard to predict from elicited
beliefs. For portfolio volatility both datasets share the intuitive positive result for risk tol-
erance and the insignificant result for qualitative return expectations. However, Hoffmann,
Post, and Pennings (2010) identify a positive effect of risk perception on portfolio volatility.
While this might again be a result of the different measurement, our findings for numerical
risk expectations strongly point in an opposite direction.
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6 Conclusion
We investigate the functional relationship between beliefs and preferences of investors and
their trading behavior. While we are still far from suggesting a definite functional form
in the spirit of equation 4, our findings are a first step to improve the understanding of
this complicated but fundamental relationship. We provide evidence that expectations are
relevant for risk taking of investors, and that they are used in a predominantly rational and
intuitive way.
Higher return expectations lead to increased risk taking in terms of volatility among
investors, while higher risk expectations have the opposite effect. Even more, changes in
portfolio risk are predicted by contemporaneous changes in return and risk expectations.
We find evidence that investors counteract changes in market volatility by reducing their
portfolio volatility relative to the market. In general the best fit of our model is achieved
for long-term portfolio volatility. Changes in short-term portfolio volatility and changes in
portfolio beta are less well or not at all predicted by changes in expectations. This relates
directly to the question how private investors manage their portfolio risk and which risk
measure is closest to their subjective experience of risk. As long-term volatility measures
react strongest to investor expectations, we take this as tentative evidence that they are a
good proxy for experienced risk.
Expectations have less predictive power for immediate trading activity of investors. We
find a positive effect of return expectations on equity buying activity, which proxies for an
adjustment of the (unobserved) risky share. However, trading is often noisy, influenced by
liquidity and other exogenous trading motives, which might be a reason why we find no
influence of risk expectations and preferences. Investors also engage in risk shifting within
their portfolio, replacing less volatile securities by more volatile ones. We infer that contrary
to two-fund separation investors use several channels to adjust their risky position. They
not only increase or decrease a fixed risky portfolio, but also change this risky portfolio
according to their expectations.
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Taken together our results suggest that financial theory in general correctly predicts
the role of return and risk expectations for actual trading behavior. Private investors take
their expectations into account to determine whether to buy or sell and whether to increase
or decrease risk taking. But at the same time investors’ reaction to expectations and pref-
erences is more nuanced and more ambiguous than in the theoretical model. Not only do
individual investors use different ways to alter their investment risk, but also some financial
risk measures such as equity beta seem to bear little relevance for them. Instead, we con-
jecture that a multitude of other factors which to describe and identify is beyond the scope
of this paper play a role in investment decisions.
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Num. return Survey Return in % in response to survey question “We would like
you to make three estimates of the return of the UK stock
market (FTSE all-share) by the end of the next three month.
Your best estimate should be your best guess.”
Num. risk Survey Volatility calculated from confidence intervals using the
methodology of Keefer and Bodily (1983) using responses to
survey question “We would like you to make three estimates
of the return of the UK stock market (FTSE all-share) by
the end of the next three month. Your high estimate should
very rarely be lower than the actual outcome of the FTSE
all-share (about once in 20 occasions). Your low estimate
should very rarely be higher than the actual outcome of the
FTSE all-share (about once in 20 occasions).”
Qual. return Survey Rating on scale 1-7 in response to question “How would you
rate the returns you expect from an investment in the UK
stock market (FTSE all-share) over the next 3 months?”
Qual. risk. Survey Rating on scale 1-7 in response to question “Over the next 3-
months, how risky do you think the UK stock market (FTSE
all-share) is?”
Risk tolerance Survey Agreement on Likert scale 1-7 to statement “It is likely I
would invest a significant sum in a high risk investment”
∆ num. return Survey Num. return(t) – num. return(t-1)
∆ num. risk Survey Num. risk(t) – num. risk(t-1)
∆ qual. return Survey Qual. return(t) – qual. return(t-1)
∆ qual. risk Survey Qual. risk(t) – qual. risk(t-1)
∆ risk tolerance Survey Risk tolerance(t) – risk tolerance(t-1)
Age Bank data Age of participants in years
Gender Bank data Gender of participants, dummy variable 1 if male, 0 if female
Wealth Survey Self-reported wealth using 9 categories: £0-10,000; £10,001–
50,000; £50,001–100,000; £100,001–150,000; £150,001–
250,000; £250,001–400,000; £400,001–600,000; £600,001–
1,000,000; > £1,000,000. Missing values were imputed.
31
Description of variables (continued)
Variable Origin Description
Income Survey Self-reported income using 8 categories: £0-20,000; £20,001–
30,000; £30,001–50,000; £50,001–75,000; £75,001–100,000;
£100,001–150,000; £150,001–200,000; > £200,000. Missing
values were imputed.
Fin. literacy Survey Number of correct responses in a 4-item financial literacy
test using questions by van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie
(2011).
Buy-sell ratio Bank data Number of purchases – number of sales divided by number
of total trades (range 0 to 1).
Buy-sell volume
ratio
Bank data Volume of purchases – volume of sales divided by total trad-
ing volume (range 0 to 1).
Volatiltiy 1y Bank data One-year historical portfolio volatility at time t.
Volatiltiy 3m Bank data Three-months historical portfolio volatility at time t.
Rel. Volatiltiy Bank data One-year historical portfolio volatility divided by one-year
historical market volatility at time t.
Portfolio beta Bank data One-year historical portfolio beta from a one factor model
using the FTSE all-share index as corresponding market in-
dex and the LIBOR as riskfree rate.
ACV Bank data Average component volatility calculated using a weighted
average of one-year historical volatility of portfolio compo-
nents owned at time t.
Trade volatility Bank data Weighted average of volatility deciles for all securities traded
between t an t+1. Volatilty is calculated over total survey
period and sorted into deciles.
Buy volatility Bank data Weighted average of volatility deciles for all securities pur-
chased between t an t+1. Volatilty is calculated over total
survey period and sorted into deciles.
Buy-sell vol. diff. Bank data Difference of volatility for securities purchased and volatility
for securities sold between t and t+1. Volatilty is calculated
over total survey period and sorted into deciles.
Portfolio value Bank data Portfolio value before the start of the survey (participants




Bank data Number of holdings before the start of the survey (partici-
pants and non-participants), and at each survey round (only
participants).
Transactions Bank data Transactions in the year before the survey start (participants




Table 1: Changes in expectations of investors
market own portfolio
∆ risk ∆ num. ∆ qual. ∆ num. ∆ qual. ∆ num. ∆ qual. ∆ num. ∆ qual.
Round tolerance return return risk risk return return risk risk
2 (Dec08) 0.23∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.12 0.023∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗ -0.09 0.023∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗
3 (Mar09) -0.10 0.014∗ 0.20∗∗ -0.001 0.03 0.030∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ -0.007∗ 0.13∗
4 (Jun09) 0.07 -0.010∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗ -0.77∗∗∗ -0.003 0.33∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗
5 (Sep09) 0.15 -0.008 0.01 -0.008 0.38∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.10 -0.008 0.02
6 (Dec09) -0.14 -0.016 -0.03 -0.011∗ 0.07 0.014 -0.17∗∗ -0.008 0.06
7 (Mar10) 0.03 -0.004 0.05 0.004 -0.22∗∗ -0.047∗∗ 0.11 0.017 -0.12
8 (Jun10) 0.21∗ 0.008 -0.27∗∗ -0.001 0.17∗ -0.010 -0.09 -0.010∗ 0.13
9 (Dec10) 0.22∗ 0.009 0.45∗∗∗ -0.015∗ -0.29∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.011 -0.29∗∗
Notes: The table states changes in risk tolerance and changes in numerical and qualitative expectations of
investors (compared to the previous survey round). Changes are significantly different from zero at *10%-
level, **5%-level, or ***1%-level (one-sided t-test).
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Table 2: Buying and selling behavior
buy-sell ratio buy-sell volume ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
num. return 0.068 0.275∗ 0.257∗ 0.040 0.251∗ 0.234
num. risk 0.059 –0.043 –0.029 0.040 –0.124 –0.106
qual. return –0.014∗ 0.009 0.013 –0.014 0.011 0.015
qual. risk –0.007 0.018 0.022 –0.008 0.020 0.024
risk tolerance –0.010∗ –0.010 –0.010 –0.012∗∗ –0.011 –0.009
∆ num. return 0.150∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗
∆ num. risk –0.058 –0.074 –0.070 –0.063 –0.115 –0.111
∆ qual. return 0.010 0.014 0.017 0.012 0.016 0.019
∆ qual. risk 0.007 0.016 0.018 0.010 0.020∗ 0.022∗
∆ risk tolerance 0.012∗ 0.007 0.007 0.011 0.005 0.006
age 0.002 0.002
gender (male=1) –0.089 –0.108
wealth –0.013 –0.010
income 0.034∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗
fin. literacy –0.034 –0.034
n 1376 769 769 767 1376 769 769 767
Notes: The table shows results of a panel tobit regression with random effects and round dummies. Dependent
variable is buy-sell ratio defined over number of trades (# of buys/# of total trades) for columns (1)-(4)
and buy-sell volume ratio defined over trading volume (buying volume/total trading volume) for columns
(5)-(8). Column (1) and (5) include levels of expectations and column (2) and (6) changes of expectations
as explanatory variables. Column (3) and (7) show regressions on both, levels and changes, in column (4)
and (8) additionally controlled for demographics. Demographic variables include age, gender, wealth, and
financial literacy. The table displays marginal effects, coefficients are significant at *10%-level, **5%-level,
or ***1%-level.
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Table 3: Robustness tests: Buying and selling behavior
buy-sell ratio buy-sell volume ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
clus. SE FE LAD clus. SE FE LAD
num. return 0.199∗∗ 0.134 0.343∗∗ 0.173 0.132 0.174
num. risk –0.025 0.090 –0.151 –0.130 –0.106 –0.162
qual. return 0.014 0.038∗ 0.008 0.018 0.034 0.011
qual. risk 0.017 0.025 0.019 0.021 0.031 0.016
risk tolerance –0.007 –0.023 –0.006 –0.006 –0.022 –0.009
∆ num. return 0.230∗∗∗ 0.179 0.252∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 0.239∗ 0.255∗
∆ num. risk –0.034 –0.006 –0.025 –0.091 –0.127 –0.020
∆ qual. return 0.019∗∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.026∗ 0.024∗∗ 0.035∗∗ 0.028∗
∆ qual. risk 0.013 0.015 0.004 0.019∗ 0.023 0.010
∆ risk tolerance 0.006 –0.005 0.006 0.004 –0.006 0.002
age 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002
gender (male=1) –0.088∗ –0.146∗ –0.118∗∗ –0.136
wealth –0.013 –0.006 –0.009 –0.012∗
income 0.029∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
fin. literacy –0.029 –0.010 –0.030 –0.023
n 767 769 767 767 769 767
Notes: The table shows results of a panel GLS regression with random effects and standard errors clustered
by participant (columns 1 and 4), a panel regression with fixed effects (columns 2 and 5), and a regression
using least absolute deviation and bootstrapped standard errors (columns 3 and 5). Dependent variable is
buy-sell ratio defined over number of trades (# of buys/# of total trades) for columns (1)-(3) and buy-
sell volume ratio defined over trading volume (buying volume/total trading volume) for columns (4)-(6).
Indipendent variables are as specified in table 2. Coefficients are significant at *10%-level, **5%-level, or
***1%-level.
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Table 4: Correlation of portfolio risk measures
PANEL A Levels of portfolio risk
Vol 1y Vol 3m Rel. Vol Beta ACV
Volatility 1y 1.00
Volatility 3m 0.76 1.00
Rel. volatility 0.89 0.59 1.00
Portfolio beta 0.42 0.28 0.43 1.00
ACV 0.64 0.54 0.50 0.23 1.00
PANEL B Changes of portfolio risk
∆ Vol 1y ∆ Vol 3m ∆ Rel. Vol ∆ Beta ∆ ACV
∆ Volatility 1y 1.00
∆ Volatility 3m 0.60 1.00
∆ Rel. volatility 0.39 0.11 1.00
∆ Portfolio beta 0.13 0.05 0.40 1.00
∆ ACV 0.60 0.32 0.06 -0.05 1.00
Notes: The table shows pairwise Pearson correlations of levels (Panel A) and changes (Panel B) of portfolio



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 8: Volatility of securities traded
Round trade volatility buy volatility buy-sell vol. diff.
Pre-survey (Jun08-Sep08) 6.20 6.42 0.33∗∗∗
Round 1 (Sep08-Dec08) 6.23 6.37 0.29∗∗
Round 2 (Dec08-Mar09) 6.02 6.05 −0.24∗∗
Round 3 (Mar09-Jun09) 5.99 5.79 −0.39∗∗∗
Round 4 (Jun09-Sep09) 6.00 5.88 −0.32∗∗∗
Round 5 (Sep09-Dec09) 5.96 6.07 −0.02
Round 6 (Dec09-Mar10) 6.03 6.04 −0.06
Round 7 (Mar10-Jun10) 5.75 5.60 −0.36∗∗
Round 8 (Jun10-Sep10) 5.86 5.84 −0.29∗∗
Round 9 (Sep10-Dec10) 5.82 5.76 −0.23∗
Notes: The table shows for all survey rounds the average volatility decile of trades and purchases, and
the average volatitity differential between purchases and sales. This difference is significant by a Wilcoxon
signed-rank test at *10%-level, **5%-level, or ***1%-level.
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Table 9: Volatility of trades explained by expectations
Random effects model Fixed effects model
trade buy buy-sell trade buy buy-sell
vola vola vol.diff. vola vola vol.diff.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
num. return 0.467 0.840∗ 1.374∗∗∗ 0.127 0.514 2.367∗∗
num. risk –0.042 –0.431 0.377 0.201 –0.199 –0.421
qual. return –0.003 0.002 –0.001 –0.027 –0.038 –0.051
qual. risk –0.038 –0.031 –0.049 –0.035 –0.037 –0.089
risk tolerance 0.045 0.082∗∗∗ 0.050 –0.015 –0.001 –0.065
age –0.017∗∗ –0.017∗∗ 0.010
gender (male=1) 0.704∗∗ 0.604∗ –0.077
income –0.047 –0.048 0.023
wealth –0.102∗∗ –0.116∗∗∗ –0.031
fin. literacy –0.391∗∗∗ –0.376∗∗∗ 0.005
R2 0.085 0.108 0.041 0.006 0.030 0.027
n 1467 1343 890 1467 1343 890
Notes: The table shows results of panel regression with random effects with clustered standard errors
(columns 1-3) or fixed effects (columns 4-6), all regressions contain round dummies. Dependent variables
are the volatility of trades, the volatility of purchases and the difference between volatility of purchases and
sales. Coefficients are significant at *10%-level, **5%-level, or ***1%-level.
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Table 10: Sample selection
Participation Panel attrition
part. ln(Vol 1y) part. ln(Vol 1y)
(1) (2a) (2b) (3) (4a) (4b)
num. return 0.131∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ –0.065 0.129∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗
num. risk –0.128∗∗∗ –0.136∗∗∗ 0.315 –0.152∗∗∗ –0.121∗∗
qual. return 0.005 0.007 –0.006 –0.003 –0.004
qual. risk 0.004 0.002 –0.010 0.001 0.000
risk tolerance 0.002 0.001 –0.002 0.005 0.003
age –0.000 –0.006∗∗∗ –0.004∗∗∗ –0.004 –0.004∗∗ —
gender (male=1) 0.168∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.117∗ 0.192 0.098 —
income — –0.014 –0.015 –0.122∗∗∗ –0.007 —
wealth — –0.031∗∗∗ –0.016∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ —
fin. literacy — –0.040 –0.033 –0.043 –0.022 —
portfolio value 0.015 –0.046∗∗∗
portfolio positions 0.062∗∗ –0.109∗∗∗
transactions 0.064∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
inv. Mills ratio 0.594∗∗∗ 0.354∗ -0.001 –0.008
n 19609 1536 1518 1825 1033 1033
Notes: The table shows two-stage heckman selection models for participation in the survey and panel attri-
tion. Column 1 displays a probit regression of participation including age and gender, and portfolio value,
portfolio positions, and transactions (all logarithmized). Columns 2a and 2b reproduce results of table 5
including the inversed Mills ratio of the first stage. Column 3 shows a probit regression for participation
within survey, colunms 4a and 4b the associated second stage estimated with random effects (4a) and fixed
effects (4b). Coefficients are significant at *10%-level, **5%-level, or ***1%-level.
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Figure 1: FTSE all-share index and survey rounds
Notes: Development of the FTSE all-share index (covers 98% of UK market capitalization) between June
2008 and December 2010. Vertical lines represent the timing of the nine survey rounds.
Figure 2: Numerical return expectations of investors
Notes: Average return expectations for the UK stock market (FTSE all share) and investors’ own portfolios.
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Figure 3: Risk expectations of investors
Notes: Qualitative risk expectations for market and own portfolio (scale 1-7, right axis), and numerical risk
expectations as implied by confidence intervals (volatilities, left axis). For comparison implied option volatility
(FTSE 100 VIX, left axis)
Figure 4: Portfolio volatility of investors and UK stock market volatility
Notes: Portfolio volatility is one-year standard deviation of daily portfolio returns at point in time of survey
rounds. Displayed are the median investor, the first-quartile and third-quartile investor. UK stock market
volatility uses the FTSE all-share index.
44
